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By MartinFeldsteifl2
My subject in this lectureis one to which Irving Fisherdevoted
considerable analytic and econometric
effort: the effect of inflation on
financial markets and capital
formation.3 Nowadays, every student learns of
Fisher's conclusion that each percentage point
increase in the steady—state
inflation rate raises the nominalinterest rate by one percent, leavingthe
real rate of interest unchanged.
Moreover, since the supply of savingdepends
on the real rate of interestand the demand for investablefunds also depends on
the real rate of interest, a changein the rate of inflation wouldhave essen-
tially no effect on the economy'Sreal equilibrium. I say"essentially" no
effect because another great Yaleeconomist, James Tobin, reminded usin the
l961 Fisher Lecture that an increasein the nominal interest rate could cause
households to substitute capital for nDneyin their portfolios, thereby reducing
the real interest rate.
The Fisher—Tobin analysis, likextost theoretical analyses of macroeco-
nomic equilibrium, ignores the role
of the taxes levied on capital income.
lThis paper was presented as the
Fisher—Schultz Lecture at the World
Congress of the EconometricSociety, 29 August 1980. Theresearch is part of
the NBER Program on Taxation andof the Bureau's special study of Capital
Formation. The financial supportof the National Science Foundationand the
NBER is gratefully acknowledged.
2i am grateful to Charles Horioka forassistance with calculations and
to James Poterba and Lawrence Summersfor earlier collaborative work.I bene-
fited from comments onpreliminary
results presented at the NBERand the Harvard
PublicFinance Seminar and from comments onan earlier draft by several
colleagues. The views expressedhere are the author's and shouldnot 'be attri-
buted toany organization.—2—
Whilethis may have been a reasonable simplification at some time in the past,
itis quite inappropriate today. Taxes on capital income with marginal rates
thatareoften between one—third and two—thirds can have profound effects on the
real macroeconomic equilibrium and on the wayinwhich inflation affects that
real equilibrium.
A simple example will illustrate the potential for substantial depar-
tures from Irving Fisher's famous neutrality result. Consider an economy in
whichsaving and the demand for nney are both perfectly inelastic,in which
there is no inflation, and in which the marginal product of capital is 10
percent. If we ignore risk and assume that allmarginalinvestments are debt
financed, the rate of interest in the economy will also be 10 percent.A
permanentincrease in the expected rate of inflation from zero to five percent
would raise the nominal internal rate of return on allinvestmentsby five per-
cent which would in turn raise the equilibrium rate of interest in the economy
from 10 percent to 15 percent. Allofthis is just as Irving Fisher would have
it.
But now consider the introduction of a corporate tax of 100percent
on the profits of the business with a deduction allowed for the interest
payments. It is easily shown that, if economic depreciation is allowed, the
interest rate that firms can afford to y remains 10 percent in the absence of
inflation. But inflation now raises the interest rate not by any increase in
the inflation rate but by that increase in inflation divided by 1—.5 Ifis—3—
50 percent, the five percent increase in expected inflation raises the interest
rate by 10 percent to 20 percent. This is easily understood since the 10 per-
cent increase only costs a firm a net—of—tax 5 percent, just the amount by which
inflation has raised the nominal return on capital.
In this example, the effect of a 5 percent inflation rate is to raise
the real rate of interest received by savers from 10 percent to 15 percent.
Their real net—of—tax rate of interest will, lowever, depend on the extent to
which the interest income is subject to personal tax. If every lender's tax
rate is exactly equal to the corporate rate, the real net rate of interest will
be unaffected by the rate of inflation.6 But nre generally, individual tax
rates differ substantially7 and the real net—of—tax return rises for those indi-
viduals with tax rates below the corporate rate and falls for the others. If
saving is sensitive to the real net return, these changes will alter the capital
intensity of the economy which in turn will change the nrginal product of capi.-
tal. The effect on the final equilibrium of a change in the expected rate of
inflation will depend on the capital—labor substitutability, on the distribution
of individual and business tax rates, and on the interest sensitivity of saving
and sney demand (as well as on the correlation between these sensitivities and
the personal tax rates). In general terms, inflation will raise capital inten-
sity in this idel if the rate at which savers are taxed is less than the tax
rate on borrowers._14 —
Introducinga more realistic description of depreciation radically
alters this conclusion. In calculating taxable profits, firms are generally
allowed to deduct the cost of capital investments only over several years.
Because these deductions are usually based on the original or "historic" cost of
the assets, the real value of these depreciation deductions can be substantially
reduced during a period of inflation. This raises the real tax rate on invest-
ment income and therefore lowers the real interest rate that firms can afford to
offer. The change in the nominal interest rate may be greater or less than the
change in inflation and depends on the balance between the positive effect of
interest rate deductibility and the adverse effect of original cost depre-
ciation. This conclusion can be extended directly to an economy with equity as
well as debt finance (Feldstein, Green and Sheshinski, 1978) and to an economy
with government debt (Feldstein, 1980a).
In short, the impact of inflation and of monetary policy depends critically
onthe fiscal setting. Itis therefore unfortunate, but all toocommon, that
theoretical analyses ofinflationand of monetary policy ignore the tax struc-
ture andassume that all taxes are lump sum levies.
Becausecapital taxrules differsubstantially among countries,infla-
tion can have very different effects in different countries on the rate and com-
position of capital accumulation. In the past several years, I have tried to
explore the theoretical relationship between inflation and tax rules and to
measure the impact of inflation in the United States on effective tax rates
(Feldstein and Summers, 1979) and on the yields on real capital, on debt and on
equity.8 Those studies, together with the results presented in the current
paper, have led me to conclude that the interaction of inflation and the—5—
existingtax rules has contributed substantially to the decline of business
investment in the United States.
The rate of business fixed investment in the United States has
fallen quite sharply since the mid—1960's. The share of national income devoted
to net nonresidential fixed investment fell by more than one—third between the
last half of the 1960's and the decade of the 1970's: the ratio of net fixed
nonresidential investment to GNP averaged 0.0140 from 1965 through 1969 but only
0.025 from 1970 through 1979.9 The corresponding rate of growth of the nonresi-
dential capital stock declined by an even greater percentage: between 1965 and
1969, the annual rate of growth of the fixed nonresidential capital stock
averaged 5.5percent;in the 1970's, this average dropped to 3.2 percent.-°
The present paper shows Ixw U.S. tax rules and a high rate of infla-
tion interact to discourage investment. The nature of this interaction is
complex and operates through several different channels. For example, while
nominal interest rates have been unusually high in recent years, the deduc-
tibility of nominal interest costs in the calculation of taxable profits implies
that thereal net—of—tax interest rates that firms payhave actually become
negative!Initself, this would of course encourage an increased rate of
investment. But, since existing tax rules limit the depreciation deduction to
amounts based onthe original cost of the assets, a higher rate of inflation
reducesthe nximuinrealrate of return that firms can afford to pay. The
effect of inflation on the incentive to invest depends on balancing the change
in the cost of funds (including equity as well as debt) against the change in
the n.ximum potential return that firms can afford to pay. This explanation of
investment behavior, which is close to Irving Fisher's own approach, is deve——6--
lopedLore precisely in section hofthe present paper and then related to the
observed variation of investment since 1955.
The interaction of tax rules and inflation can also be seenin a
simpler and Lore direct way. The combined effectsof original cost depre-.
ciation, the taxation of nominal capital gains, andother tax rules raises the
effective tax rate paid on the capital income of the corporatesector by the
corporations,their owners arid their creditors. This reduces thereal net rate
f returnthat theultimate suppliersofcapital can obtainon nonresidential
fixedinvestment. This in turn reduces the incentive to save anddistorts the
flow of saving away from fixed nonresidential. investment.L'ven without spe-
cifying the mehanisra by which the financial marketsand managerial decision-s
achieve this reallocation, the variations in investment durmn-the past three
decades can be related to changes in this real net rate of return.This
approach is pursued in section 3ofthe present paper.
In addition to these two approaches, I have also examinedthe imilica-
tions of inflation in a can-ital stock adjustment model of the typedeveloped by
Jorgenson and his collaborators.11 Those results are presentedin section 5of
thepresent paper.
1. on Estimatind Falsei'lodels
1yfocus in this paper is on assessing the extent towhichinvesLneflt
responds to changes in the incentives that areconditioned bytax rules.
Separatecalculations based onprevious research are then usedtoevaluate
theeffect on investment of the interaction between inflationand the tax rules.
Despite the extensive amount of research that hasbeen done on invest—
isent behavior, there are still many economists who questionwoether inves tsient—7—
doesrespond significantly to what might generally be called "price incentives"
and not just to business cycle condit,ions.1-2 One itmortant reason for these
doubts is tlie failure of previous studies to reflect correctly the impact of
inflation. When the price incentive variable is significantly sismeasured, it
isnot surprising that its impacton investment isunderstated. A further, and,
I believe, more fundamental reason, is thattheinvestment process is far too
complex for anysingle econometric nDdel tobe convincing. Iloreover, making a
statisticalrdel rxre complicated in an attempt to represent some particular
key features of "reality" or of rational optimization often requires imposing
otherexplicit and implausible assumptions asmaintained hypotheses.
Theproblem posed for the applied econoetrician by the complexity of
reality and the incompleteness of available theory is certainly not limited to
studies of investment. In Irr experience, there are relatively few )roblems in
whichthe standard textbook procedure of specifying "the correctrdel" and then
estimatingthe unknown parameters can produce convincing estimates. 1uch rnre
commonis the situation in which the specifications suggested by a rich economic
theory overexhaust the information n the data. In time seriesanalysis, this
exhaustionoccurs rapidly because of the limiteddegrees of freedom. Buteven
withvery large cross—section samples, collincarity problems reduce the effec-
tive degrees of freedom and make it impossible to consider all of the variables
or functional forms that a rich theory woul.d suggest. These problems are exa-
cerbated bythe inadequate character of the data themselves.Even when irifor—
mationis available and nasurement errors are small, the accounting Iriasures
usedby business firms and national income accounts rarely correspond to the
concepts of economic theory.—8--
Theresult of allthis is that in practiceall econometric secificu—
tions are necessarily "false" raoeiLs.Theyare false models not only inthe
innocuous sense that the residuals reflect omitted variables butalsoin the
more serioussense that the omissions and other misspecificatioiis make it
impossible to obtain unbiased or consistent estimates of the parameters even by
sophisticated transformations of the data. The applied econornetrician, like the
theorist, soon discovers from experience that a useful otdel is not one that is
"true" or ttrealisticfl but one that is parsimonious, plausible and informative..
Unfortunately, econometric research is not often described in such
humbleternis. The resultingclash between the conventional textbook interpreta-
tionof econometric estimates and the obvious limitations of false sdels has
ledto an increasing skepticism inthe Irofeionabout the usefulness of econo—
metric evidence. While some of this skepticism may be a justifiable antidote to
naive optissism and exagerated claims, I believe it is hosed on a misun-
derstanding of the potential contribution ofempiricalresarch in economics.
I airi convinced thateconometricanalysis helps us to learn about the
economy andthatbetter econometric methods help ustomakesorereliable
inferences from the evidence.ButI would rejectthe traditional view of sta-
tistical inference that regards the estimation of an econometric equation as
analogous to the "critical experiment" of the natural sciences that can, rith a
single experiment, provide a definitive answer to a central scientific cjuestion.
I would similarly reject an over simplified Bayesian view of inference that pre-
sumes that the economist can specify an explicit prior distribution over the set
of allpossibletrue models or that the likelihood function is so informative
that it permits transforming a very diffuse prior over allpossiblemodels into a
very concentrated posterior distr ibut ion.—9—
AlthoughI. am very sympathetic to the general Bayesian logic, I think
that such well—specified priors and such inforLiative likelihood I'unction3are
incompatible with the "false models" and inadequate data with which we are
forcedto work. I think that thelearning process is gorecomplex. Perhaps the
phrase"expert inference" best captures what I have in mind. The expert sees
not one study but many. He examines not only the re,ression coefficients but
also the data themselves. He understands the limits of the data and the nature
of the institutions. He forms his juc1ements about the importance of omitted
variables and about the plausibility of restrictions on the basis of all this
knowledge and of his understanding of the theory of economics and statistics.
In a general way, he behaves like the Bayesian who combines prior information
and sample evidence to form a posterior distribution, but, because of the
limitations and diversity of the data and the nodels that have been estimated,
he cannot follow the formal rules of Bayesian inference.13
As a practical matter, we often need different studies to learn about
different aspects of any problem. The idea of estimating a single complete
model that tells about all the parameters of interest and tests all implicit
restrictions is generally not feasible with the available data. Instead, judge—
mentsmust be formed by studying the results of several studies, each of which
focuses on part of the problem and makes false assumptions about other parts.
The basic reference on this type of "expert inference" isn't Jeffreys,
Zeilner or Learner.It is the children's fable about the five blind :en who exa-
mined an elephant. The important lesson in that story is not the fact that each
blind man came away with a partial and "incorrect" piece of evidence. The
lesson is rather than an intelligent maharajah who studied the findings of these—10--
five mencouldprobably piece together a good judgmental picture of an
elephant, especially ifhehad previously seen someotherfour—footed aLuial.
Thedanger,of course, in this procedure is that any study based on a
falsenodel may yield biased estimates of the effects of interest. Although
informed judgment may help the researcher to distinguish innocuous maintained
hypotheses from harmful ones, some doubt will always remain. Ingeneral,
however,the biases in different studies willnot bethe sane. If the biases
aresubstantial, different studies will pointto significantlydifferent conclu-
sions. In contrast, a finding that the results of several quite different
studies all point to the same conclusion suggests that thespecificationerrors
ineach of the studies are relatively innocuous.
When the data. cannot be used to d stinguish among alternative plausible
models, the overall economic process is underdentified. This may matterfor
some purposes but notforothers. Even if the process as a whole is underiden—
tified, the implications with respect to some particular variable (i.e., the
conditional predictions of the effect of changingsomevariable) may be the
same for allnodeisandthereforeunaffected bytheunderidentification. This
'partial identification' is achieved, because the data contain a clear Lssage
that is not sensitive to nodel specification.
Of course, not all issues can be resolved in this satisfying way. For
many problems, different plausible specificatione lead to quitedifferent
conclusions. When this happens, the aspect that is of interest (i.e., tne pre-
dicted effect of changing a particular variable) is effectively underidentified.
No matter how precisely the coefficients of any particular specification may
appear to be estimated, the relevant likelihood ñ1rctionis very flat. In these
cases, estimating alternative nodels to study thesame question can be a uzeful—11.-
reminderofthe limits of our knowledge.14
2.. Usin;_Alternative i1odels of' lnveGtment}chavior
Thepotential advantage of using several alternative nrsimonious
modelsis well illustrated by the analysis ofinvestment behavior. There are a
widevariety of empirical issues thatareof substantial importance for both
understanding the economy and assessing the importance of different government
policies. How sensitive is investment to tax incentives? To interest rates? To
share prices? To the expectation of future changes in tax rules or market
conditions? Andwhatis the time—pattern of the response to these stimuli?
While an estimate of tithe correct ndel"of investment behavior could inprin-
ciple answer all of these questions at unce, it is in practice necessary to pur-
sue different questions with different studies. The purpose of the present study,
asI indicated in the introduction, is to assess the extent to which changes in
tax incentives and disincentives —andrticularly those changes that aredue
toinflation —alterthe flow of investment. Focusing on this issue ireans that
some assumptions must explicity or implicitly be made about the other issues and
that the estimated effect of the tax changes is conditional on thoseassump-
tions. I find itquitereassuring therefore that estimates based on three quite
differentkinds of rdels all point to the same conclusion about the likely
magnitude of the response to inflation and to effective tax rates.
The current state of investment theory also indicates the need to exa-
mine alternative s'dels. Wnilethere is probably considerable reement about
theessential features of a very simple theoretical del of investment
behavior, there is much less concensus about theappropriateframework for
applied studies of investment behavior. The disagreements about empirical
specification can conveniently be grouped in four areas.15—12—
Tec hnolo
The traditional capital stock adjustment irodels assume thatcapitalis
homogeneous and that the purpose of investment is to increase the size ofthis
homogeneous stock until, roughlyspeaking,the return onth lastunitofcapi-
tal isreducedto the cost offunds.An alternative and rorerealisticview
seescapital as quite heterogeneous. There are two aspects of such heteroge-
neity. First, capital consists of a large nuroer of different kinds of equip—
meetand structures. At any pointintime there nybe too much of one kind of
capitalandtoolittle of another. A simple aggregate relationship loses this
potentiallyimportant information. A much sorefundamental kind of heteroge-
neity is associated with the flow of new investment opportunities. Each year,
new investment possibilities are created by innovations in technology, tasteand
market conditions. This exogenous flow of new investment opportunities with
high rates of return can induce investment even when the total stock of capital
is too large in the sense that the marginal product of an equiproportiona]-
increase in all types of capital is less than the cost of funds or the value of
Tobin's q—ratiois less than oneJ6
Even within the fracework of homogeneous capital rrodels, there has
been much debate about the choice between putty—putty models in which all
investment decisions are reversible and the putty—clay models in which invested
capital hasapermanently fixed capital—labor ratioJT While the truth no doubt
liessomewherebetween these extremes (old equipment and processes can be
modifiedbut not costlessly 'melted down' and reformed), the nre complex
putty—clay model is undoubtedly a more realistic microeconomic descriptionthan
the putty-putty model.—13—
Closelyrelated is theissueof replacement investment, a quite
significant issue since roughlyone—halfof gross investment is absorbed in
replacement. The simplest nodel of replacement is that a constant fraction of
the homogeneous capital stock wears out each period. A more realistic descrip-
tion would recognize that output decay is not exponential but varies with the
age of the equipment. r4ore generally, the timing of replacement and the level
of maintenance expenditure are economic decisions that will respond to actual
and anticipated changes in the cost of capital and other inputs.18
Market Environment:
The conventional Keynesian picture of investment that motivates the
accelerator model of investment and most other capital stock adjustment models
asswnes that each firm's sales are exogenous. The firm is assumed to take the
price of its product and the level of its sales as given, and then to select the
capacity to produce this level of output. A more general specification would
recognize that the firm sets its ownlevelof output, taking as given either the
market price of its product or the den'and function for its product.
There are analogous issues about the nature of the markets in which
the firms buy inputs. The simplest assumption is that these markets are perfect
and that the market prices do not depend on the quantities purchased. A more
realistic description would recognize that the short—run supply function of
labor to the individual firra is likely to be less than infinitely elastic and
that, for the economy as a whole, the short—run supply price of capital as well
as labor is an increasing function of the quantity purchased.19
Closely related is the sensitivity of adjustment costs to the volume of
investment. The simplest assumption is that there are no adjustment costs and—14-
that the total cost of any total investment is independent of the speed at which
it is done. In contrast, the managerial and planning costs riny be a significant
part of the cost of capital acquisition arid may rise exponentially with the
rates of net and gross investment. Abel (1918) has shown Iw a capital stock
adjustment ridel can be extended to include adjustment costs and how doing so
can explain why the firm increases its rate of investment only slowly even when
the marginal return on installed capital substantially exceeds its cost.
Financial Behavior:
There remains much controversy about the role of internal and external
finance and about the related issue of the factors determining the cost of funds
to the firm. The simplest sdel assumes that the costs of debt and equity funds
are independent ofboththe debt—equity ratio arid the volume of the firm's
external finance. More general analyses reject the extrerac Modigliani—1iler
result and recognize that, beyond a certain point, increases in the debt—equity
ratioraise the cost of funds. Similarly, it is frequently argued that the
availabilityof retained earnings lowers the cost of funds (at least in the eyes
of management) and therefore affects the timing even if not the equilibrium
level of investment.20
Tax rules significantly affect the costs to the firm of debt and
equity finance. The implications of this obvious statement have been the sub-
ject of much research and debate in the past few years.2- At one extreme is the
conclusion of Stiglitz (1913) that U.S. firms should finance marginal investments
exclusively by debt, retaining earnings to avoid the dividend tax and using the
retained earnings to finance intramarginal investments. Auerbach (1918),
Bradford(1919) and King (1911) have argued that retaining earnings does not—15--
avoidthe dividend tax but oniy postponesitwithout lowering its present value;
this implies that retained earnings are substantially less costly than new
equity funds and that the capital stock should be expanded even if the market
valuation of additional capital is less than one—for—one.22 These types of
conclusions reflect a world of certainty and one in which allindividual
investors have the same personal income tax rates. Although complete models
withuncertainty and diverse individual tax rates have not yet been fully
worked out, itisclear from partial studies (e.g., Feldstein and Green (1919)
andFeldstein andSlemrod (1930)), that these extensions can significantly alter
conventionalresults.
Expectations and the Decision Process
With a putty—putty technology and reversible investment, expectations
are irrelevant. But when an investment commits the firm to a future capital
stock with a fixed capital—labor ratio, expectations about the future are
crucial. Although simple moving averages of past variables are the most common
representationof the process by which expectations are formed, this si:aplifica—
tion iy cause serious aisspecification errors in some contexts. Helliwell and
Glorieux (1970) and Abel (1978) have developed forward looking models of
expectations. Lucas (1976) has emphasized the potential instability of allsuch
fixed—coefficient average representations while Sargent (1978) and Summers
(1980) have shown both the possibility and the difficulty of developing even
quite simple models of factor demand that are consistent with rational
expectations.
Even when investment models acknowledge that expectations are
uncertain, the assumption of risk neutrality is usually invoked to simplify the-16-
analysis.In fact, investment behavior may be substantially influenced byrisk
aversion, changes in risk perception, andthepursuit of strategies that reduce
the risk of major capital conrnitments.
In each of the cases that I have been describing, the researcher must
choose (implicitly or explicitly) between a sore tractable but usually less
realistic assumption and an assumption that is sore realistic but alsosoredif-
ficultto apply statistically. In general, the choice hasgonein favor of the
more tractable but less realistic specification. Moreover, implementing any one
of the sore complex assumDtions often makes it too difficult to implement some
other sore realistic assumption, thus inevitably forcing the researcher to
choose among false nodels.
The work of Jorgenson andhiscollaborators23 well illustrates this
problem of choice. In each case, Jorgenson and his colleagues have selected the
more tractable but less realistic assumption. Because they impose the further
restriction that the technology of each firm is Cobb—Douglas, the data are
required only to determine the time pattern of the response of investment to
prior changes in the desired capital stock.2 There is no separate estimation of
the effect of tax rules and no specific tests of the implied effect on invest-
ment of changes in tax rules and inflation. In section 5ofthe present paper,
I adopt the general Jorgenson specification but relax the constraint that the
technologyisCobb—Douglas and also the constraint that the response of firms to
thetax induced changes in the user cost ofcapitalis thesameas their
response to other sources of variation in the user cost of capital.The results
indicatethat a correct measurement of the impact of inflation in the context
of this nodel substantially increases its explanatory power and that with the—11—
correctlymeasured variables the data are consistent with an elasticity of'
substitution of one and with the assumption that firms respond in the same iay
to allchangesin the user cost of capital.
Of' course, the support for this conclusion is conditioned on allof
the other false intained assumptions. I have, wever, also examined two
other quite different sdels that do not impose these constraints. The analysis
of section3,which relates investmentto the realnet—of—tax rate of' return
received by the suppliers of capital, avoids any reference to financial market
variables. While it is thereforeobviously completely uninformative about many
potentiallyinteresting issues, it avoids conditioning the estimated respon-
siveness of investment on any theoryofcorporate finance. The specification in
termsof theflowof investment avoids the assumption of homogeneous capital or
aputty—putty technology. Again, this makes the rrdel uninformative about
important issues but avoids constraining the results by some obviously strong
assumptions of a false sdel. There are of course potential biases in this
approach since it failsto distinguish different reasons for changes in invest-
ment andomits variables that may be significant (e.g., changes in government
debt, international capital flow, or other factors that would in principle be
reflected in financial variables).
The third approach, presented in section ,avoidssome of these
problems but, of course, at the cost of introducing new ones. This specifica-
tion relates the flow of investment to the difference between the cost of funds
to the firm and the maximum potentialrate of return that the firm can affor to
pay ona standardinvestment project. The financialcostof fundsis thus
explicitly included. This however requires specifying the "true" cost of debt-18-
and equity funds and their relative importance. The specificationdoes however
avoid restrictive assumptions about technology arid other aspects 01'investment
behavior. But, like the other two specifications, this return—over—cost speci-
fication is a false rodel whose coefficients might well be biased.
The strength of the empirical evidence therefore rests on the fact
that all three quite different specifications support the same conclusionthat
the heavier tax burden associated with inflation has substantially depressed
nonresidential investment in the United States. The magnitude of the effect
implied by each of these three dels indicates that theadverse changes in the
tax variables since 1965 have depressed investment by more than one percentof
GNP, a reduction which exceeds 1O percent of the rate ofinvestment in recent
years.
3. Investment and the Real Net Rate of Return
Individuals divide their income between saving and consuming and, to
the extent that they save, those resources are distributed among housing,
inventories, plant and equipment, and investments abroad. Individualswake
these decisions not only directly, but also through financial intermediaries,
and through the corporations of which they are direct and indirectshareholders.
The rst fundamental determinant of the extent to which individuals
channel resources into nonresidential fixed investment should be thereal net—
of—tax rate of return on that investment, a variable that I willdenote
Althoughthe idea of the real net—of—tax return isconceptually simple, its
calculationinvolves a number of practical as well as theoretical difficulties.
Because ofdatalimitations, the calculation isrestrictedto nonfinancial cor-
porations eventhough total nonresidential fixed investment refers to asomewhat—19—
broader set of firms. The real net return is defined as the product of the real
pretax return oncapital(H) arid one minus the effective tax rate (l_ER) on that
return.
Thepretax return is estimated as the ratio of profits plus interest
expenses to the value of the capital stock. Profits are based on economic
depreciation and a correct measure of inventory costs; capital gains and losses
on thecorporatedebt are irrelevant since the calculation deals with the corn—
bined return to debt and equity. The value of the capital stock includes the
replacement cost value of fixed capital and inventories and. the rarket value of
land. The pretax rate of return is shown in column 3 of Table i.26
The effective tax rate on this capital income includes the taxes paid
by the corporations, their shareholders and their creditors to the federal
government and to the state and local governments. The shareholders and credi-
tors consist not only of individuals but also of various financial intermediaries
including banks, pension ftnds, and insurance companies. In an earlier study,
Lawrence Summers and I did a detailed analysis of the distribution ofcorporate
equity and debt among the different classes of shareholders and creditors and of
the relevant irarginal federal tax rates for each such investor (Feldstein and
Summers, 1979). More recently, James Poterba and I refined this analysis and
extended it to include the taxes paid to state and local governments. The
effective rate of tax is shown in column L of Table 1. The resulting net—of—tax
rate of return is shown in the fifth column.
The pretax rate of return varies cyclically as well as fromyear to
year but has experienced no overall trend.27 The average return from 1953
through 1979 was 11.0 percent. The effective tax rate was quite high in the 1950's—20-.
Table I









(n/y)(I/K) CR) (ETH) (r) (HA)(ri) (RNA)
(1) (2) (3) (11) (5) (6) (i') (8)
1953 0.027 o.0110 o.ii11 0.7145 0.029 0.105 NA NA
19511 0.023 0.033 .0.107 0.687 0.0311 0.117 0.7511 0.029
1955 0.028 o.o14i 0.132 0.665 0.01411 0.130 0.712
0.0314 1956 0.031 o.o1411 0.1114 0.724 0.032 0.111
1957 0.029 0.0140 0.105 0.711 0.030 0.1114 0.715
1958 0.017 0.023 0.090 0.707 0.026 0.113 0.113
0.038
.
1959 0.020 0.028 0.112 0.673 0.036 0.125
1960 0.022 0.030 0.1011 0.665 0.035 0.122 0.7114 0.035
0.038
1961 0.019 0.027 0.103 0.6614 0.035 0.1211 0.689
0.6143 o.o116
1962 0.023 0.033 0.117 0.615 0.0145 0.130
1963 0.023 0.033 0.1211 0.606 0.0149 0.136 0.629
19614 0.029 0.0111 0.1314 0.562 0.059 0.1141 0.591
0.062
1965 0.0110 0.057 0.1145 0.551 0.065 0.1145 0.573
1966 0.0115 0.0614 0.1115 0.560 o.o614 0.137 0.595
0.603 0.050 1967 0.038 0.052 0.130 0.5614 0.057 0.126
0.04i
1968 0.037 0.051 0.130 0.626 0.0149 0.123 0.663
0.027
1969 0.038 0.051 0.117 0.673 0.038 0.113
0.022
1970 0.031 o.o140 0.096 0.705 0.028 o.io6 0.792
0.782 0.025
1971 0.025 0.032 0.100 .0.677 0.032 0.112
0.032 1972 0.028 0.037 0.108 0.625 0.0111 0.113 0.720
0.021
1913 0.0314 o.o116 0.105 0.701 0.031 0.102 0.795
—0.008
19714 0.031 o.o110 0.082 0.901 0.008 0.096 1.079
0.017 1975 o.oi14 0.017 o.o86 0.7211 0.0214 0.115
0.017
1916 0.015 0.019 0.095 0.681 0.030 0.1114 0.850
NA
1971 0.020 0.026 0.097 0.683 0.031 0.109
NA
1918 0.025 0.033 0.091 0.722 0.027 0.i014 NA—21—
andthen declined sharply in the 1960's; at the individual levelthis reflected
a significant reduction in personal tax rates while at thecorporate level this
reflected changes in depreciation rules and thestatutory corporate tax rate.
Since the mid—1960's, the effective tax rate has nrwedsharply and somewhat errati-
cally upwards, primarily reflecting the overstatement of capital income thatoccurs
when inflation distorts the measurement of depreciation,inventory profits,
interest payments, and capital gains.28 The growth of state andlocal taxes and
various changes in personal tax rates contributed somewhat to thisoverall
increase. The real net rate of return shows a generalpattern that reflects the
changing effective tax rate as well as the cyclical and year—to—year fluc-
tuations in the pretax rate of return. This key rate of returnvaried around
3.3 percent in the 1950's, rose by the mid—60's to 6.5percentwhile averaging
5.0percentfor the 1960's as a whole and then dropped in the 1970's toan
average ofonly2.8 percent.
Sincethe net rate of return varies cyclically, its estimatedimpact
on investment can reflect cyclical as well as xre fundamental influences.To
separate these effects, theequations in this section relate the investment rate
toa cyclical measure ofaggregatedemandaswell as to the real net return. It
isalso useful to consider two InDre explicitways of focusing on the irxre fun-
damental changes in the real rate of return. Acyclically adjusted measure of
thereal net return was calculated as follows.First, the real pretax rate of
return (n)isadjusted by regressing itonthe difference between GNP and capa-
city GNPand then calculating the rate of return for eachyear at a standard GNP
gap of 1.7 percent; this variable, denoted RA (for adjusted) and shown in column
6ofTable 1, eliminates cyclical but not year—to—year variationsin the pretax—22—
return. Since there is no trend in the pretax return, eliminating random as
well as cyclical variations in the pretax return would leave only a constant.
The cyclical and random fluctuations in the effective tax rate were
eliminated in a sore fundamental way by using the explicit statutory provisions.
Using a nthod developed in an earlier study (Feldstein and Summers, 1978) and
describedsore fully insection 1 ofthepresent paper,I calculated the real
net rate of return that a firm could afford to pay on the debt and equity used
to finance a new investment that, in the absence of all taxes, would have a real
yield of 12 percent. This net rate of return varies from year to year because
of changes in the tax rules and in the anticipated rate of inflation. The ratio
of the net rate of return on a mixofdebt and equity to the assumed 12 percent
realpretax return xasures the changes in the effective tax rate that are
not due to fluctuations in the pretax rate of return, the rate of current
investment, or other year—to—year fluctuations. More formally, this ratio
equals1—ETRA and the ETRA value is shown in column 1ofTable 1.29
Combiningthe adjusted pretax return and the adjusted effective tax
rate gives the adjusted net return (RNA=RA(1—ETRA)) shown in column 8of
Table1.
Although this variable is purged of cyclical variation, it still
reflects year—to—year variation in the pretax return. Eliminating all such
variation and treating the pretax return as a constant implies that all of the
variation in the net return comes from the effective tax rate variable. This
possibility is tested below in the context of a sore general specification in
which both RNA and 1—ETRA are included separately.
The basic specification relates the ratio of real net investment to
real GNP (In11) to the real net rate of return (RN) and the Federal Reserve—23—
Board's measure of capacity utilization (UcAP).30 I use annual data and lag both
regressors one year31:
n
It (3.1) —= a0+a1RNt...1 +a2UCAPt_l +
Yt
where Utisa random disturbance about which nre will be said below.
Although quarterly data could have been constructed, much of the basic
information that is used to calculate the net return variable is available only
annually; the within—year variations in a quarterly series would therefore be
largely interpolations of doubtful economic iieaning.32
A lag in response has been found in all previous investment studies
and reflects the delays in decision—making and in the production and delivery of
plant and equipment. The lag also avoids the obvious problem of simultaneity
between concurrent investment and capacity utilization or other nasures of
busirtess cycle activity. More general lag structures and other possible
explanatory variables have been considered; those results are also described
below.
All of the specifications are estimated by least squares with a first—
order autocorrelation correction. The autocorrelation correction algorithm
estimates the first—order autocorrelation parameter simultaneously with the
other coefficients using a procedure that is equivalent to maximumlikelihoodif
the disturbances are normally distributed. This correction adds to the eff i—
ciency of the estimates and, more importantly, avoids the potentially serious
downward bias in the estimated standard errors about which Granger and Newbold
(19714) have so persuasively warned. For many of the basic specifications I have
also checked the constraint implied by the first—order transformation and foundthat it cannot be rejected; I have also estimated the specification in first
difference form and found similar coefficients. The evidence on this ispre-
sentedbelow. (I might also add that simple OLS estimates without autocorrela—
tion correction also produce essentially the same results.),
The basic result is shown in equation 3.2:






with standard errors shownin parentheses and the coefficient of uti indicating
thefirst—order autocorrelation correction parameter. Before looking at other
specifications, it is useful to consider briefly the magnitude of the estimated
coefficients. Since the net return variable had a standard deviation of 0.013
for the sample period, a imve of RN from one standard deviation below the mean
to one standard deviation above would increase the investment ratio by about
0.012, approximately 1.5 times its standard deviation and 45 percent of its
25—year average value. Since the capacity utilization variable has a standard
deviation of 0.044, a two—standard deviation increase in this variable would
raise the investment ratio by about 0.0025 or only one—fifth of the change
induced by a similar change in RN.33
Reestimating equation 2.2 in first—difference form (for 1955 through
1978) shows that the estimated coefficient of RN is quite robust: its coef-
ficient is 0.471 with a standard error of 0.113. The capacity utilization coef——25—
ficientfalls to 0.008 with a standard error of 0.021 and the Durbin—Watson
statistic indicates negative serial correlation. To test the constraints
imposed by the first—order autocorrelation adjustment, I estimated the ordinary
least squares regression of the investment ratio on its own lagged value and on
one— and two—period lags in RN and UCAP. The reduction in the revised sum of
squares was only 6 percent and the corresponding F—statistic of 0.51 was far
less than the 5—percent critical value of 3.55.
Using the cyclically adjusted measure of the net return (RNA) gives
greater weight to the cyclical capacity utilization variable and slightly lowers
the estimated effect of changes in the fundamental determinants of the net
n
It






Several different ire general distributed lag specifications were
also estimated. There is some weak evidence that the mean lag between RN and
the investment ratio is longer than a year and that the cumulative effect of
RN on the investment ratio is larger than equation 3.2 implies. For example,
when the variable RNt....2 is added to the earlier specification, its coefficient
is 0.20 with a standard error of 0.l1; the sum of the coefficients on and
RNt1 becomes 0.60. Second—order polynominal distributed lags with a four or
five year span and a final value constrained to be zero imply that the coef—
ficientsof Hilt_i and RNt_2 are significantly different from zero but that—26—
further coefficients are not; the sum of the coefficients varies between 0.5
and 0.55, depending on the exact specification. Further lags on the capacity
utilization variables are never both positive and significantly different from
zero.
Redefining the investment variable as the ratio of net investment to
capacity GNP has essentially no effect; the coefficient of RN rises to 0.50
(standard error 0.10) and the capacity utilization coefficient remains essen-
tially unchanged at 0.026 (s.e. =0.026).
Allofthe equations are estimated using the net rate of investment
because I believe that the Commerce Department's very disaggregated procedure
for calculating economic depreciation, while far from perfect, is better than
the alternative of studying gross investment and assuming that depreciation is a
constant fraction of the past year's capital stock. Nevertheless, as a further
test of the robustness of the conclusion that RN is important, I have estimated
such a gross investment equation:
n







Thesecoefficients confirm theimportance of RN but suggest that the net invest-
ment specificationoverstates the importance of RN relative to UCAP. However,
the very large coefficient of the lagged capital variable, implying an
implausible 16 percent annual depreciation rate for plant and equipment, is a
warning against giving too much weight to this specification.35—27—
The results are not sensitive to the use of capacity utilization to
measure the effect of aggregate demand. Using the unemployment rate for men
over 19 years old leaves the coefficient of RN at 0.51 (standard error =0.077)
while using the proportional gap between GNP and capacity GNP leaves the coef—
ficient of RN at 0.105 (s.c.0.070). A one percentage point decline in this
unemployment rate raises the investment ratio by a relatively small 0.0016;
similarly, a one percentage point decline in the GNP gap raises the investment
ratio by only 0.0010. Additional accelerator variables (i.e., a distributed lag
of proportional changes in GNP) were insignificant when capacity utilization was
included in the equation.
Several additional variables that are sometimes associated with
investment were added to equation 3.2. Three of these variables were each
insignificant andchangedthe coefficient of RN by less than 0.02: the ratio of
corporate cashflow to GNP lagged one year; the ratio of the federal government
deficit to GNP lagged one year;6 and a time trend. When the one year lagged
value of Tobin's q variable is included,37 its coefficient is 0.011 (with a
standard error of 0.o71) and the coefficient of RN drops slightly to 0.391
(s.e. 0.117).
The actual inflation rate (lagged one year), andthepredicted long—
term inflation rate38 (also lagged one year) were completely insignificant and
had very little effect on the coefficient of RN. Including both the actual and
expected inflation rates did not change this conclusion. The full effect of
inflation on investment is captured in the current specification by the RN
variable itself.
Allofthe specification experiments described in the past several—28—
paragraphs have also been repeated with the cyclically adjusted RNA variable
with very similar results.
The specification in terms of the net return assumes that investment
responds equally to changes in the pretax return and in the effective tax rate.
Two tests of this assumption indicate that it is consistent with the data. If
instead of using RNt_i equation 3.2 is reestimated with and l_ETRt_i as
separate variables, the sumofsquared residuals actually rises; i.e., the two
variables actually explain less than their product does. An explicit statisti-
cal test is possible if RN in equation 3.2 is replaced by its logarithm; since
in RN =inH +in(1—ETH), the equality of the two coefficients of ln R and in
(1—ETR) can be tested explicitly.39 Neither coefficient is estimatedvery
precisely (each has a t—statistic of less than 1.5) and the equality of the two
coefficients is easily accepted (the F statistic is only 0.51).
Estimatingthe analogous decomposition for the cyclically adjusted
variables, i.e., replacing RNAbyRA and l—ETRA, is interesting because it sheds
light on the question of whether the year—to—year noncyclical variations in the
pretax return matter. Two things should be noted. First, this substitution
reduces the explanatory power of the equation as measured by the corrected
this favors keeping the simple specification in terms of RNA. Second, if both
variables are included separately, the coefficient of the HA variable is much
less than its standard error (0.033 with a standard error of 0.172) while the
coefficient of the ETRA variable is statistically significant and economically
important: _Q.QI with a standard error of 0.017. This suggests that year to
year fluctuations in the pretax return have not been important but that the rise
in ETHA from about 0.57 in the in..id—1960's to about 0.85 inthem.id—1970ts was
enoughto reduce the investment ratio by more than one jrcentae point.—29—
An important indication of the plausibility andreliabilityof any
siraple nodel is the stability of the coefficients in different subperiods.
Equations 3.5 and 3.6showthe result of splitting the sample in half:
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Thecoefficients of RN are remarkably similar and the relevant F—statistic indi-
cates that the hypothesis ofequalcoefficients for the two subperiods cannot be
rejectedat the 5 percent levei.140
Afurther test of the robustness and usefulness of an equation is its
performance in out of sample forecasts. The basic specification was reestimated
forthe period from 19514 through1970andthis equation wasthenused topredict
the investment ratio for each year from 1971 through 1978. These predictions
are based on the two lagged variables only (R11t..i and UCAPt_i) and do not use
the lagged disturbance (ut_i) or any lagged dependent variable. The results—30—
shown in Table 2 are remarkably good. The meanabsolute prediction error
(0.0035)is only two—thirds of the mean year—to—year change(0.0050) in the
investmentratio. The year—to—year changes are also predicted quitewell, with
the correct sign in 6 of the 7 years and a mean errorthat is only one—third of
the average change.
To conclude the discussion of the net returnmndel of investment beha-
vior, it is useful to consider its implicationfor understanding the decline in
the investment ratio since 1966. The first columnof Table 3 shows that the
investment ratio fell from 0.0I5 in 1966 to less thanhalf that value in the
last four years of the sample period. The 1965value of RN was 0.065, the
highest of any year in the sample and the1965 value of UCAP was 0.896, the
second highest value and only slightly below the1966 UCAP value of 0.911.
Column 2 uses the estimated effect of changes in RN(i.e., 0.I59 from equation
3.2) to calculate the investment ratio for each of the 25 sample yearscon-
ditional on RN =0.065;i.e., each figure in column 2 equals thecorresponding
figure in column 1 plus 0.59 times (0.065 —RN_i).Similarly, column 3 uses
the estimated effect of changes in UCAP to calculatethe investment ratio con-
ditional on UCAP =0.896.-It is clear from the figures in column 2that the
fall in RN can account for st of the decline in theinvestment ratio since
1966 and that the post—1966 fluctuations in UCAP cannotaccount for much ofthe
decline.If RN had been kept at its 1965 level, net, investmentfrom 1970 to
1978 would have taken an average of L.1 percent of GNPinstead of the actual
average of only 2.5 percent, an increaseof two—thirds. By contrast, main-
taining the high 1965 level of capacity utilizationwould only have raised the
average investment —GNPratio by 0.5 percentage points. It is alsoworth—31-
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1971 0.025 0.019 0.02b — — —
1972 0.028 0.020 0.027 0.003 0.001 0.003
1973 0.03L4 0.028 0.033 0.006 0.008 0.006
l971 0.031 0.027 0.026 —0.003 —0.001 —0.007
1975 0.0i1 0.015 O.OO1 —0.017 —0.012 —0.022
1976 0.015 0.012 0.012 0.001 —0.003 0.008
1977 0.020 0.020 0.016 0.005 0.008 O.OOI
1978 0.025 0.022 — 0.005 0.002 —
Predictors are based on equations fitted through 1970 only. Columns 2 and 5
are based on the specification of equation 3.1 vhile columns 3 and 6 are based
on the specification of equation 1.6.—32—
Table III
Actual and Conditional Ratios of
Net Nonresidential Investraent to GNP







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1954 0.023 0.040 0.023
1955 0.028 0.043 0.031
— — —
1956 0.031 o.o4i 0.032
0.039 0.035
1957 0.029 . 0.045 0.030
0.035 o.04i 0.033
1958 0.017 0.033 0.019
0.036 0.032




1960 0.022 0.035 0.024 0.026
0.024 0.031
1961 0.019 0.033 0.022
0.026 0.028
1962 0.023 0.037 0.027 0.026
0.023 0.026
1963 0.023 0.033 0.026 0.025
0.024 0.032
1964 0.029 0.036 0.030 0.032
0.025 0.029
1965 0.040 0.043 o.04i 0.042
0.030 0.033
1966 0.045 0.045 0.0145 0.048
0.040 0.043
1967 0.038 0.033 0.037 0.042
0.045 0.045
1968 0.037 o.o4i 0.038 o.o4i
o.o4i 0.036
1969 0.038 o.o46 0.039 0.043
0.038 0.039
1970 0.031 0.043 0.032 0.038
0.040
1971 0.025 0.042 0.028 0.031
0.038 0.033
1972 0.028 0.044 0.032 0.033
0.033 0.032
1973 0.034 0.046 0.036
0.034 0.037




1975 0.014 0.040 0.015 0.030
0.033
1976 0.015 0.034 0.019 0.024
0.038 0.018
1977 0.020 0.036 0.023 0.028
0.027








2, 3 and 14
4.7.
are based on equation 3.2; columns 5 and 6 are based on—33—
notingthat if the 1965 level of RN had been reached a decade earlier, invest-
ment during that decade would have averaged an additional 1.2 percent of GNP.
Equation 3.2 can also be used to estimate an approximate but explicit effect of
inflation on the investment ratio. In an earlier study, Lawrence Summers and I
estimated the change in the tax liability on corporate source income that is
caused by the interaction of inflation and the tax iaws.)2 For example, in 1977
(the last year of our study) inflation raised the tax liability by $32.3 billion
or 1.9 percent of the corresponding capital stock.)3 The estimate of RNt_i in
equation 2.2 implies that a 1.9 percentage point increase in RN for 1977 would
raise the 1978 investment ratio by 0.009 to 0.031k; this value is shown in column
l of Table 3. Similarly calculated values for earlier years indicate that the
interaction between inflation and the tax rules reduced investment in'the 1970's
by an average of 0.8 percent of GNP or about one—third of the actual level of
net investment.
1. Investment and the Rate of Return over Cost4
In the absence of taxes, the simplest specification of a firm's
investment behavior is that it invests whenever the rate of return on an
available project exceeds the cost of additional funds. More generally, the
costs of changing the rate of investment and the uncertainty associated with
investment returns make the firm's decision problem nre compiex)5 It is
nevertheless useful to describe the firm's rate of investment as responding to
the difference between potential rates of' return and the cost of funds.
In terms of the traditional marginal efficiency of investment schedule
that Keynes borrowed from Irving Fisher, an upward shift of the marginal effi—ciency schedule or a downward shift in the cost of funds will increase the rate
of investment.If' we select a particular rate of investment, we can sasure the
upward shift of the marginal efficiency schedule by what happens to theinternal
rate of return at that rate of investment.16 A rise in the difference between
the internal rate of return and the cost of funds should induce a higher rate of
investment.
This idea can be extended to an economy with a complex tax structure
and with inflation. A change in the tax rules or in the expected rate of infla-
tion alters the rate of' return on all projects (in a sense that I will make nre
precise below). These fiscal and inflation changes therefore act in a waythat
is equivalentto shifting the marginal efficiency of investment schedule in a
simpler economy.
Whenwe switchfrom a taxiess economy to one with company taxes and
depreciationrules, the concept of the internal rate of return must be extended
to what I shall call the maximum potential net return (MPNR). For simplicity,I
shall describe this first for the case in which the firm relies exclusively on
debt finance. I shall then note how the analysis is easily extended toinclude
equity finance as well.
In a taxless economy, the internal rate of return on a project is the
maximum rate of return that a firm can afford to pay on a loan used to finance
that project.If' Lt is the loan balance at time t and xt (for t =l,2,...,T)is
the net cash flow of the project in year t (before interest expenses), the





whereL0 is the initial cost of the project and LT =0.Solution of equation





When a tax at rate T is levied on the net output minus the sum of the
interest yment and the allowable depreciation (d), the nRximum potential
interest rate (MPIR) is defined according to
(Ii.3)Lt —Lt_i=rLt_1
—xt+ T(xt —dt—rLt...i)
where LT =0and L0 equals the initial cost of the project minus any investment
tax credit.
If xt is the real cash flow of the project, inflation at a constant
rate iThasthe effect of increasing the nominal cash flow to (1+iT)t xt and the
MPIR rises to the value of r thatsolves:
(14.1k) Lt —Lt_i
=rLt..i
—Ci+11)t xt + [(i+)t xt —cit
—rLt_il.
Althoughin a taxless world the MPIR would rise by the rate of inflation, the
relative importance of historic cost depreciation and the deductibility of nomi-
nal interest yments determines whether r rises by more or less than the
increase in TV.—36—
Thecalculation of the MPIR is made operational by specifying the real
cash flow from a hypothetical project and the associated series of allowable tax
depreciation.I adopt here the samespecifications that I used inFeldstein
and Summers (1918). The hypothetical project is a "sandwich" of which66.2 per-
cent of the investment in the first year is a structure that lasts 30 years and
the remainder is an equipment investment that is replaced at the end of 10 years
and 20 years.1 The internal rate of return in the absence of taxes is set at 12
percent for both the equipment and structure components. The net output ofthe
equipment is subject to exponential decay at 13 percent until it is scrapped
while the net output of the structure is subject to 3 percent decay. The depre-
ciation rules, tax rate, and credits are than varied from year to year as the
law changes.
The expected rate of inflation in each year is calculated fromthe
consumer expenditure deflator using the optimal ARDIA forecasting procedureof
Box and Jenkins (1970).8 The calculation assumes that forecasts made at each
date are based only on the information available at that time and that the ARI1A
process estimated at each date is based only on the nDst recent10 years of
quarterly data. The calculation of the 1PIR is based on the entire sequenceof
forecasted future inflation rates and not on any single average long—term
expected inflation rate)9
If firms did finance marginal proj ects exclusively by debt, it would
be sufficient to relate the net rate of investment to the difference between
theMPIRand the long—term nominal interest rate (as well as to capacity utiliza-
tion orsome other measure of cyclical demand). The correct assuniption about
the marginal debt—equity mixis not clear. In the current analysis,I have—37—
assumedthat firms use debt and equity at the n.rin in the same ratio thatthey
do on average, i.e., that debt accounts for only one—third of total finance.
The notion of the MPIR must therefore be extended to the Maximum PotentialNet
Return (MPNR) defined as the riximum net—of—corporate—tax nominalyield that the
firm can payonthe mixoffunds that is one—third debt and two—thirds equity.
Since debt and equity are treated very differently by the corporation tax
(interest payments are deductible but dividendsare not), the MPNR will not
equal the MPIR.
Thenthod ofcalculating the MPIR in the all—debt case can neverthe-
less be applied directly to find the value of the MPNR. In thespecial all—debt
case, the MPNR =(l—T)r;the solution of a difference equation like 4.14iS ther—
fore equivalent to finding MPNR/(1—t) in the all—debt case. Moregenerally,
however, regardless ofthe mix of debt and equity finance, the solution of
equation4•14can be interpreted as equivalent toMPNR/(1_T). Since I isknown,
this yields MPNR directly. Annual valuesfor MPNR are presented in column 1of
Table14•
Note that the MPNR is definedin terms of a hypothetical project with a
fixedpretax yield of 12 percent. All of the year—to—year variation in the MPNR
is due to changes in taxrulesand expected inflation. An alternative MPNR
serieshas also been calculated in which the pretax rate of return is allowed to
vary; more specifically, MPNRVP (v for varying profitability) replaces the 12
percentassumption with a cyclically—adjustedprofitability series for each year's
newinvestment that is very similar to the RA variable discussed in section 3of
the present paper.51 The MPNRVP series is presented in column 2of Table 14.
TheMPNRisthe net nominal amountthatfirms can potentially afford
topay for funds. The actual net nominal cost of funds is:—38—
Table IV
Potential andActual NetCosts of Funds
MPNR- MPRNVP—
MPNR MPNRVP COF COF COF
(i) (2) (3)() (5)
l954 0.087 0.078 0.078 0.009 0.000
1955 0.089 0.084 0.077 0.012 0.007
1956 0.089 o.o71.. 0.067 0.023 0.008
1957 0.091 0.073 0.070 0.020 0.002
1958 0.090 0.075 0.058 0.032 0.011
1959 0.090 0.081 0.060 0.031 0.022
1960 0.090 o.o8 0.059 0.031 0.018
1961 0.090 0.081 0.o1-9 0.0.i1 0.032
1962 0.093 0.088 0.056 0.037 0.032
1963 0.09b 0.091 0.056 0.038 0.035
1961.t 0.099 0.098 0.055 0.0L4 0.043
1965 0.102 0.102 0.058 0.0b3 0.01t3
1966 0.101 0.097 0.067 0.034 0.030
1967 0.101 0.092 0.061 0.040 0.031
1968 0.097 0.037 0.066 0.030 0.021
1969 0.093 0.015 0.0Th 0.020 0.001
1970 0.097 0.073 0.078 0.019 —o.oo6
1971 0.102 .0.081 0.075 0.027 o.oo6
1972 0.105 0.082 0.071 0.0314 0.010
1973 o.io6 0.072 0.095 0.011 —0.022
19714 0.111 0.062. 0.11414 —0.0314 —0.082
1975 0.110 0.083 0.108 0.002 —0.025
1976 0.109 0.080 0.107 0.002 —0.027—39—
(14.5) COFI(1—T)j+. (e+ir)
3 3
where I is the long—term bond interest rate and e is the real equity earnings
per dollar of share value.5' The cost of funds series is presented in column 3.
The current section of this paper examines a nrdel that n.kes the rate
of net investment a function of (1) the difference between the potential and
actualcost of funds and (2) the rate of capacity utilization:
(14.6) I =b0+b1 (MPNR —COF)t_i+b2UCAPt_i+ Ut.
Yt
Columns 14and 5 of Table 14 present the time series of this yield difference.
These figures indicate that the incentive as low in the 1950's, became quite
powerful in the mid—1960's, began to fail in the early 1970's and then dropped
very sharply in the mid—1970's.
The pattern of the past decade reflects the fact that, because of
historic cost depreciation, inflation raised the I.1PR rather little while the
cost of funds rose substantially.52 Between 1966 and 1976, the cost of funds
rose by four percentage points while the MPiR rose by less than one percentage
point.53
As in section 2, the current analysisuses annual data and lags both
regressorsone rear. Equation 14.6 and a variety of related specifications have
been estimated by least squares with a first—order autocorrelation correction.
Specific tests for the basic specifications show that the implied constraints
are not binding, i.e., that the first—order autocorrelation correction is not_140_
inferior to a rrore general first—order ARMA process. Estimates in first—
difference form also produce very similar coefficients to those obtained with
the autocorrelat ion transformation.









indicate the yield differential has a powerful effect and the variations in
capacity utilization are also important.
Since the return—over—cost variable hadastandard deviation of 0.017
over the sample period, a sve from one standard deviation below the mean to one
standard deviation above would raise the investment ratio by 0.011, approxima-
tely 1.3 times its standard deviation and L0 percent of its 25—year average
value. A two standard deviation nove in capacity utilization would raise
investment by o.oo6, or only about half as much.
Using the varying—profitability measure of the potential net return
reduces the corresponding coefficient:






However, since this measure is much core variable (the standard deviation of
I4PNRVP—COF is 0.028), a two—standard deviation iiove implies a slightly bigger
change of 0.012 in the investment ratio.
Lagged values of the regressors were insignificant and polynomial
distributed lags of different lengths for the return—over--cost variable did not
alter the implications of equations 14.6 and 14.7. Redefining the investment
variable as a ratio to capacity GNP had no effect on the coefficients.
Sinilarly, substituting for capacity utilization the unemployment rate for nen
over ae 19 or the GNP gap ratio did not significantly alter the coefficient of
the return—over—cost variable. Moreover, a distributed lag of proportional
changes in past output was insignificant when capacity utilization wasincluded
inthe equation.
The switch fromthenet investment equation to a gross investment
equationcaused some reduction in the coefficient of the return—over—cost
variable (to 0.215 with a standard error of 0.072), but the extremely small and
totally insignificant coefficient of the lagged capital stock variables (0.002
witha standard error of 0.093) n.kes this gross investment specification
implausible.
A time trend andalagged ratio of corporate cash flow to GNP were
tried as additional variables; neither was significant and the coefficient of
the return—over—cost variable remained unchanged. A lagged ratio of retained
earnings to GNP was "mildly significant" (a t—statistic of1.3) but left the
coefficientof the return—over—cost variable unchanged. The lagged ratio of the
federal government deficit to GNP had a surprisingly positive coefficient but
its inclusion did not alter the coefficient of the return—over—cost variable.—12—
The one—year lagged value of Tobin's q ratio td a coefficient of 0.012 (with a
standard error of 0.009), while the coefficient of the return—over—cost variable
remained essentially unchanged at 0.289 (with a standard error of 0.068).
Neither the current inflation rate nor the expected inflation rate was statisti-
cally significant.
A powerful test of the appropriateness of equation is obtained by
estimating separate coefficients for the rate of return (MPNR) and cost of funds
(COF) variables:
R.9) = —0.055 + o.169MPNRt_i— 0.319COFt1 +0.071kUCAPt1 +O.66u1






Acomparison of the sum of squared residuals of equations )4.7 and 4.9showsthat
the coefficients of !.IPNR and COF do not differ significantly. The separate
coefficient of COF inequation1.9isalmostidenticalto the combined return—
over—costcoefficient in equation 14.7;thecoefficient of the return variable is
larger but so too is its standard error.
Theseparate estimate of the MPNR coefficient in equation 14.9 is also
particularly important because the MPNRvariablereflects only the interaction
of tax rules and inflation but not the market interest rate or equity yield.
The finding that the MPNR coefficient is even larger than the COF coefficient is
therefore powerful evidence of the effect of the tax—inflation interaction.55
A test of the stability of the basic coefficients over time also pro—
vides reassuring support about the plausibility and reliability of the model.Equations 1.l0 and .11 show the result of splitting the sample in half:














The coefficients are quite similar and the F—statistic of 0.695 indicates that
the hypothesis of an unchanged structure cannot be rejected at any conventional
level of significance. The results for the varying—profitability specification
are even irore striking: the coefficent of the return—over—cost variable is
0.206 (s.e. =0.089)in the first half of the period and 0.200 (s.e. =0.033)in
the second half.
Out—of—sample forecasts based on estimating equation 1.6for1955
through 1970 are shown in Table 2. The agreement between the actual and pre-
dicted investment ratios is quite close. The nan absolute prediction error
(0.0035) is the same as with the net return equation of section 2 and only two—
thirdsof the nan year—to—year change inthe investment ratio. The year—to—_L4 1_
year changes are predicted even nre closely and both turning points are
correctly indentified.
The parameter estimates of equation i.7 can be used to analyze the
sharp decline in net investment since 1966. Column 5 of Table 2 shows the
investment ratio which in principle would have been observed if the return—over—
cost had remained at its 1965 value of 0.013. Instead of dropping to an average
of only 0.025 from 1970 through 1977, it would have averaged forty percent
higher, 0.035. By contrast, even if the capacity utilization rate could
have been kept at the overheated level of 0.896, the investment ratio in the
1970—77 period would only have increased twenty percent to 0.030.
The specific contribution of inflation to the decline in the value of
the return—over—cost variable is difficult to determine. One simple way of
measuring this effect is by a regression of the return—over—cost variable on the
predicted long—term inflation rate. The coefficient in this regression (—1.27
with a standard error of o.ii) and the rise in the long—term inflation variable
by0.031 between 1965 and 1976 together imply that inflation reduced the return—
over—cost by 0.0432 during this period. The coefficient of the return—over—cost
variable (0.316 inequation h.7) impliesthat inflation reduced the investment
ratioby .01k over this period. This equals almost all of the 0.015 fall in the
investment ratio caused by the decline in the return-over—cost6 and nre than
half of the observed decline in the investment ratio between 1966 and 1977.
5. The Flexible Capital Stock Adjustment Model
The flexible capital stock adjustment rdel developed by Jorgenson and
his collaborators is the direct descendent of that great work—horse of invest-
ment equations, the accelerator. Instead of the accelerator's assumption of a— 5—
fixedcapital—output ratio, the nore generalnodelallows the capital—output
ratio to respond to changes in the cost of capital ownership and therefore to
changesin tax rules and inflation. Implicit in the simplest version ofthis
modelarea number of very strong and generally undesirable assumptions,
including homogeneous capital, a putty—putty technology, constant proportional
replacement, myopic and risk—neutral decision—making, and a known, exogenous
financial mix. The present section accepts these assumptions in order to focus
on the problem of measuring the effect of inflation in the frameworkof this
popular and influential ixodel. The analysis shows that thetraditional imple-
mentation of the nodel has not given adequate attention to inflation and that
any attempt to analyze the recent investment experience onthe basis of that
implementation would be misleading.
The analysis here is limited to investment in equipment. The proce-
dure of estimating separate investment equations for equipment and structures is
traditional in this framework because the tax rules differ for the two types of
equipment. The implicit assumption of two independent investment demandTh.nc—
tions, one for equipment—capital and the other for structure—capital,is clearly
a poor description of reality. To the extent that investments in structuresand
equipment are decided as a package, the nodel of the previous section is a pre-
ferable specification.57
The basic nodel is well—known and can be summarized briefly. Each
firm has a desired capital stock at each time (Kt) arid, to the extent thatits
actual capital falls short of the desired capital, the firm immediately orders
capital goods to eliminate the difference. The sum of installed capitaland
capital—on—order is thus equal to the desired capital stock at the endof each—6—
period. This implies that in each period the net stock of outstanding orders is
increased or decreased by exactly the change in the desired capital stock,
**
Kt_i.Since there are delivery delays, the observed net investment can




This specification is based on an implicit assumption about replace-
ment investment: The existing stock decays exponentially at a constant rate d,
requiringreplacement investment of dKt1 to be nude in year tto naintain the
capitalstock.Since firms know the delivery lag distribution exactly, they can
anticipate the replacement investment that will be required in each future year
(up to the length of the longest delivery lag) and can therefore order replace-
ment investment far enough in advance to make exactly the required replacement.
Gross investment is therefore given by:
g
T * *
(5.2)It = (ic_ —Kt...j_i)+dKt_i
j=1
With a constant elasticity of substitution production function, the
first order conditions of profit maximization imply that the desired capital
stock is related to the level of output (Q), the price of output (p) and the
annual cost of capital services (c) according to:8
*
I — a, a 5.3jKt
—a¼p/c) t—7—
where c is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor and a is the
capital coefficient •in the production function. Substituting 5.3 into 5.2 yields:
(5.) =aa Wj [(/C)a_ t-j -(p/c)at_j_iQt--i) + dKt_i
The accelerator nde1 implicity assumes o0 while the Cobb—Douglas technology
assumed by Jorgenson and his collaborators ixplies c=l. In the present section,
I shall show that the flexible ndel witha>O is imore strongly supported by the
data than the simpler accelerator nxdel. The n.ximum likelihood estimate of c
is less than one but the likelihood function is too flat to reject the
Cobb—Douglas assumption .59
The annual cost of capital services reflects the price level for
investment goods (p1), the real net cost of funds (R), the exponential rate of
depreciation (d), the corporate tax rate (T), the investment taxcredit60 (x) and
the present value of the depreciation allowances per dollar of investment (Z):
P1 (i_tz_x) (a + d)
= ______________________
1—T
Inflation affects the value of this crucial variable in two important
ways through the cost of funds (a) and through the present value of depreciation
•(z). In their original study, Hall and Jorgenson (1967) assumed a fixed nominal
interest rate of 20 percent for the cost of funds. In the nest recent of the
Jorgenson studies, this assumption was replaced by the specification that
R =(i—r)iwhere i is a long—term bond interest rate (Gordon and Jorgenson,
1976). This overstates the cost of debt capital (by ignoring inflation) andignores the role of equity capital. The expected real net cost of debt capital
is (l—T)i —it (where is expected inflation) since thedebtis repaid in
depreciated dollars.61 Column 1 of Table 5 presents this n'asure of thereal net
cost of debt. Despite the rapid rise in the Baa rate itself, the real net cost
of debt funds actually declined since the mid—1960's.
The cost of equity capital (e) is the ratio of equity earnings per
dollar of share price. The conventional earnings—price ratio can be misleading
when there is inflation since it is based on book earnings rather than real eco-
nomic earnings. Book earnings overstate real earnings by using historic cost
depreciation and some FIFO inventory accounting but also understate real ear—
flings by excluding the real reduction in the value of outstanding debt that
occurs because of inflation.62 The correct earnings price ratio is presentedin
column 2 of Table 5. The cost of equity funds clearly rose substantially since
the rnid—1960's even when the conventional series is appropriately corrected.
Defining the real net cost of funds (R) as a fixed—weight average with
one—third debt (the average ratio of debt to capital for the past two decades)
implies :63
(5.6) R=I [(l_T)i—i+ e
3 3
This series, presented in column 3 of Table 5, shows no trend ftoxa the
mid—1950's through the mid—1960's but then a gradual but substantial rise to the
mid—1970' s.
The second important way in which inflation affects the cost of capital
services is through the value of depreciation. Since depreciation allowancesTable V
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(5) (6) (1) (8) (9)
No.2
(10)
19514—0.013o.o6 0.0140 0.069 o.6144 0.549 0.21410.221 0.211
1955—0.010o.o6 o.o14i 0.068 0.677 0.582 0.236 0.218
0.237
1956—0.008 0.059 0.037 0.063
0.207
0.713 0.6014 0.230 0.223 0.211
0.233
1957—0.0014 0.065 0.0142 0.068 0.703 0.613 0.2146 0.2314 0.216
0.233
0.2142
19580.000 0.053 0.035 0.057 0.7145 0.620 0.227 0.228 0.2114
19590.001 0.051 0.034 0.057 0.7149 0.625 0.226 0.2314 0.215
0.235
19600.000 0.055 0.037 0.061 0.739 0.629 0.233 0.233 0.216
0.235
19610.005 0.01414 0.031 0.050 0.781 0.633 0.215 0.230 0.2114
0.237
19620.006 0.064 0.0144 o.o6i 0.756 0.652 0.231 0.218
0.231
19630.006 0.062 0.0143 0.060
0.205
0.776 0.671 0.224 0.2114
0.230
19640.006 0.058 o.o14i 0.058
0.203
0.782 0.673 0.206 0.203
0.225
19650.006 0.062 0.043 o.o6i
0.190
0.7714 o.6i14 0.2014 0.197 0.2014
0.210
0.2014
19660.009 0.076 0.053 0.073 0.7140 0.675 0.226 0.206
19670.012 0.067 0.0149 0.068
0.190
0.757 0.676 0.217 0.208 0.189
0.213
19680.008 0.068 0.0148 0.071 0.749 0.676 0.221 0.214 0.185
0.210
19690.004 0.075 0.052 0.083 0,718 0.677 0.253 0.239 0.2014
0.213
0.234
19700.011 0.084 0.059 0.092 0.695 0.617 0.263 0.241
19710.006 o.o6i 0.0142 0.078
0.205
0.762 0.714 0.2114 0.216
0.234
19720.008 0.062 0.0144 0.076
0.190
0.767 0.7114 0.206 0.206 0.182
0.207
1973—0.003 0.085 0.056 0.099 0.717 0.7114 0.222 0.202 0.176
0.199
L97—0.034 0.116 0.066 0.146 0.629 0.1114 0.2144 0.202 0.169
0.198
1975—0.001 0.100 0.067 0.119 0.678 0.714 0.236 0.203 0.168
0.195
1976—0.005 0.080 0.052 0.1014 0.707 0.7114 0.2114 0.200 0.169
1977—0.012 0.1114 0.072 0.127 0.663 0.715 0.2145 0.197 0.163
0.190
0.198—50—
are fixed in nominal terms, the real present value of the depreciation (z) is
reduced when the rate of inflation rises. This present value should be calculated
using a nominal cost of funds or, equivalently, the future depreciation allowan-
ces should be restated in real. terms and then discounted at the real cost of
funds. Column 14 of Table 5 presented the nominal cost of funds; this is the
real cost of funds (shown in column 3) plus the expected rate of inflation.6
Thevalues ofZ presented in column 5 reflect changes in this discount rate as
wellaschanges in the depreciation ruies.65 In the early years, Z rises signi-
ficantly but, since 196i, Z has drifted down because of the rising discount rate
despite the continuing acceleration of depreciation.
The importance of specifying this discount rate correctly can be seen
by comparing these Z values with the alternative "Z10"valuespresented in
column 6;theZl0 values are calculated with a constant 10 percent discount
rate, the procedure used by Jorgenson andhiscollaborators. With a constant
discountrate, the evolution of the Zl0 variable reflects only the increasingly
favorable statutory rules and therefore has actually increased during the st
decade while the true value has been declining.
The composite relative cost of capital services (i.e., the c variable
defined in equation 5.5 deflated by the output. price) is presented in column 7
of Table 5. This measure of the relative cost of capital services falls gra-
dually from the 1950ts to a low point in the mid—1960's and then begins rising
again. By the end of the sample period (1977), the relative cost of capital
is back to its level of the 1950's. This reversal of the incentive to invest is
observed if the inflation induced changes in Z and Rare ignored; column 8pre-
sents a false relative cost series that incorporates Zl0 (i.e., a constant 10—51—
percent discount rate to value depreciation) and that measures the cost of funds
bythe net nominal interest rate.
The Cobb—Douglas technology assumed by Jorgenson and his collaborators
is a convenient place to begin testing the significance of the relative cost of
capital services. I have estimated equation 5.4 subject to the restriction that
the elasticity of substitution is one and compared it to the simpler accelerator
model in which the elasticity of substitution is zero. In both specifications,
the distributed lag weights were constrained to fit a third degree polynomial
(with four years of lags and a fifth year constrained to zero).
By purely statistical criteria, the evidence clearly favors the
Cobb—Douglas price sensitivity model to the accelerator indel. Withthe
Cobb—Douglas technology, the is 0.980 and the sum of squared residuals is
112.3. By contrast, for the accelerator odel the is only 0.961 and the sum
of squared residuals is 215.9. An approximate likelihood ratio test strongly
rejects the restriction to a zero substitution elasticity.66
t4isspecifying the cost of capital series by failing to represent
correctly the effect of inflation also reduces the explanatory power of the
model. Following the Jorgenson procedure of evaluating depreciation allowances
with a fixed 10 percent interest rate and defining the cost of funds in terms of
the net nominal rate (i.e., using the incorrect c/p series presented in column
8 of Table 5) cause the to fall to 0.970 (from 0.980) and raises the sum of
squared residuals to i61.1 (from 112.3).
Although relaxing the Cobb—Douglas assumption andestimatingthe
elasticity of substitution could in principle indicate the sensitivity of
investment, the data are not informative enough to provide a precise value for—52-.
this parameter.With the correctly measured value of the user cost of capital,
themaximum likelihood estimate of the substitution elasticity is 0.9 but the
reductioninthesumof squared residuals to 112.2 is triviai.67
Furthertests of the cost—sensitivity assumption can in principle be
achieved by allowing separate elasticities with respect to the different com-
ponents of the cost of capital services. In place of equation 5.3,thesore
generalspecification is:






Instead of trying to estimate alltheseelasticities, three different forms of
5.7'weretried. The first constrains 01 =1.The resulting estimatesfor
02 and were 1.8 and 3.2, respectively, but the reduction in the sum of squared
residuals to 100.1 from 112.3 in the Cobb—Douglas case is not significant. The
second specification, which constrains ala3, impliesestimates of 02 =0.6
and01 =03=1but the sum of squared residuals (io6.6)is again not sini—
ficantlylower than in the Cobb—Douglas specification. Finally, the constraint
that 01 =02implies estimates of 01 =02
=0.5and031.0; the sumof
squaredresiduals of 97.0 is again not sufficiently low to cause a rejection of
theCobb—Douglas assumption.
The Chow test for the stability of the coefficients easily sustains the
hypothesis of no change between the first and second halves of the sample, but
thatissore a reflection of the smallsamplethan of any close agreement in
parameter values.
It should be clear from the remarks earlier in this paper than I
believe that the assumptions involved in the present sodel are far too restric——53—
tivearid implausible for the xdel to be regarded as "true" in any sense. It is
however ofsome importance that, even within the highly constrained assumptions
of the present nidel, the data provide clear support for a responsiveness of
investment to changes in a correctly measured cost of capital services in
general and to the changes caused by inflation in particular. Although the data
are not rich enough to provide precise estimates of the responsiveness of
investment to the individual components of the cost of capital, it is worth
riotingthatthe evidence shows that a correct accounting of the impact of infla-
tion substantially improves the ability of theanalysis to explain the variation
ininvestment over the past 25 years.
On the assumption of a Cobb—Douglas technology, the fall in the rela-
tive cost of capital services between the mid—1950's andthemid—1960's was
enoughto raise the desired ratio of equipment capital to output by nearly 12
percent.68 Since net equipment investment averaged only about 3 percent of the
equipment capital stock at the beginning of the period, the desired increasein
capital would require a rise of rrre than !0 percent in the ratio of equipment
investment to capital to achieve the desired capital output ratio within a
decade and a bigger rise to achieve the adjustment sooner. In fact, the
investment—capital ratio in 1966—69 was 0.065, more than double its averagein
1956— 65.
The subsequent rise in the value of c/p to an average of 0.235 for the
year's 19Th—Il reversed the previous change in the desired capital—output
ratio. A Cobb—Douglas technology implies a reduction in the desired capital—
output ratio of nearly 10 percent between the inid—1960's and the mid—19'lO's.
Achieving this 10 percent change in the capital—output ratio required a much_514_
larger proportional fall in investment duringthe transitionperiod. In fact,
the rate of growth of the net equipment capital stock fell sharply, from0.065
in 1966—69 to 0.036 in 1916—19. This in turn implied a one—third fall inthe
ratio of equipment investment to GNP, from 2.0 in the mid—60's to 1.3 percentin
the mid—TO's.
The specific impact of inflation in this xdel operates through two
channels. First, inflation increases the cost of capital services by reducing
the present value of depreciation allowances (z), a reduction that reflects the
increasing nominal cost of funds. Second, inflation can increase the costof
capital services directly by raising the real cost of funds(R).69 The combined
effect of both cf these changes can be seen by comparing the actual cost of
capital services (column 7 of Table 5) with the cost of capitalservices calcu—
lated with the real and nominal costs of funds held constant at their 1965
levels (column 9). Instead of rising between the inid—1960's and the mid—1910's,
the cost of capital falls sharply, reflecting the favorable changes in statutory
tax rules. A similar, although less dramatic conclusion appears even if the
effect of inflation in raising the real cost of funds is ignored. The figures
in column 10 calculate Z by using a nominal cost of funds constructed as the
actual real cost of funds plus the 1965 expected inflation rate of 1.8 percent.
Although the difference between columns 7 and 10 understates the adverseeffect
of inflation, even this measure shows that without the increase in inflationthe
incentive to investment would have become stronger rather than weaker in the
decade after the niid—1960's.—55—
6. ConcludingRemarks
I began this paper by emphasizing that theoretical nvdels of' macroeco-
nomic equilibrium should specify explicitly the role of distortionary taxes,
especially taxes on capital income. The failure to include such tax rules can
have dramatic and misleading effects on the qualitative as well as the quan-
titative properties of macroeconomic theories. The statistical evidence pre-
sented later in the paper bears out the likely importance of these fiscal
effects in studying the non—neutrality of expected inflation.
In discussing the problem of statistical inference, I noted that the
complexity of economic problems, the inadequaceies of economic data, and the
weakness of the restrictions imposed by general economic theory together make it
impossible to apply in practice the textbook injunction to estimate a "true"
model within which allparametervalues can be inferred and all hypothesis
tested. Learning in economics is a ire complex and inperfectly understood pro-
cess in which we develop judgements and convictions by combining econometric
estimates, theoretical insights and institutional knowledge. The use of several
alternative "false" ndels can strengthen our understanding and confidence
because the same biases are not likely to be present in quite different iodels.
This view of the problem of statistical inference in econometrics
leads me to conclude that as practicing econometricians we should be both nore
humble and irore optimistic than is currently fashionable. We should have the
humility to recognize that each econometric study is just another piece of
information about a complex subject rather than the definitive estimate of some
true sodel. But 'we should also be rrore optimistic that the accumulating and—56—
siftingof this econometric information will permit specialists to make better
and rrore informed judgexnents.
Iillustrated these theoretical and statistical ideas by estimating
alternativendels of investment behavior with a focus on understanding how the
interactionbetween inflation and existing rules has influencedinvestment
behavior. The results of each of these ndels show that the rising rate of
inflation has, because of the structure of existing U.S tax rules, substantially
discouraged investment in the past 15 years.
A more general implication of these results is that inetary policy is
far from neutral with respect to economic activity, even in the long run when
the induced change in inflation is fully anticipated. Because of the nonindexed
fiscal structure, even a fully anticipated rate of inflation causes a misalloca-
tion of resources in general and a distortion of resources away from investment
in plant and equipment in particular.7° The traditional idea of "easy money to
encourage investment" that has guided U.S. policy for the past20 years has
backfired and, by raising therateof inflation, has actually caused a reduction
in investxnerlt.h1
It would of course be useful to extend the current analysis in a
number of ways. I am currently examining how the interaction of inflation and
taxrulesaffects the demand for consumption in general and for housing capital
in particular. Further studies shouldbedone on the effects of inflation and
tax rules on the demand for government debt, on financial markets, and on inter-
national capital flows.72 More information about investment behavior could be
developed by applying the three nodels of the current paper on a nore disaggre—
gated basis.—57—
Ibegan this paper by commenting that Irving Fisher's analysis of
inflation had ignored the effects of taxation. Even so, Fisher favored the
very tax reform that would eliminate the distorting effects of inflation on the
taxation of capital income. In a lecture published in the January 1931 issue of
Econoetrica entitled "Income in Theory and Income Taxation in Practice,"
Fisher advocated a progressive expenditure or consumption tax. Although his
reasons for preferring such a tax did not include its inflation neutrality my
remarks today give a further reason for thinking that Fisher was right.
Harvard University
and
National Bureau of Economic Research—58—
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3. See, for example, Fisher (1896, 1930).
1.Intramarginal investments may be financed by the equity resulting from the
extrepreneurs' original investment and from subsequent retained earnings. See
Stiglitz (1913) for such a nodel.
5.Feldstein(1976) examines this simple case as well as the nore general
situationin which bothsaving and noney demand are sensitive to the rate of
return.If f' is the marginal product of capital and ir is the rate of infla-
tion, the nominal interest rate satisfies i=f' +
6.If lenders are taxed at 100 0 percent, the net—of—tax nominal interest rate
rises by (i—0)/(i—t) times the increase in the rate of inflation. With 8t
thisis one and the real net interest rate therefore remains unchanged.
7. Individual tax rates include not only the statutory personal tax ratesbut
the tax rates on savings channelled through pension funds, insurance and
otherfinancial intermediaries.—65—
8. SeeFeldstein and Poterba (1980b) with respect to yields on real capital;
Feldstein and Summers (1978), Feldstein and Eckstein (1970) and Feldstein and
Chamberlain (1973) with respect to yields on debt; and Feldstein (1980b, 1980c)
with respect to equity yields.
9.Dataon net fixed nonresidential investment is presented in Table 5.3ofthe
National Income and Product Accounts. The fulltiraeseries is presented in
Table 1 of the current paper.
10. See Table 1 of the current paper for the annual values. Data on the net
stock of fixed nonresidential capital is presented in the Survey of Current
Business, April.1976 and subsequent issues.
11. See Jorgenson (1963), Hall and Jorgenson (1967), Gordon and Jorgenson (1976)
and Hall (1977) among others.
12. See, e.g., the article by Clark (1979) and the book by Eisner (1979) for
recent examples of studies thatconcludethat price incentive effects are econo-
mically insignificant or, at most, are quite small.
13. Learner (1978) presents very insightful coiarnents about the problems of
inference and specification search as well as some specific techniques that
can be rigorously Justified in certain simple contexts.
1!.Fora simplified formal analogy, consider the problem of estimating the
elasticityof demand for some product with respect to permanent income. Since
permanent income is not observed, some proxy must be used. Each potential
proxy is however likelytointroduce a bias of its own. If the estimated—66—
elasticity is similar for several quite different proxies, there is a reasonable
presumption that each bias is relatively small.
15. No attempt is made here to survey the existing empirical research on invest-.
ment or to examine allofthe arguments about specification. For recent
surveys, see Nickell (1978) andRowleyand Trivedi (1975).
16. This is quite separate from the reason for investing when q is less than
one that is implied by the analysis of Auerbach (1979), Bradford (1979) and King
(1977).
17. See Nickell (1918) for an extensive discussion of putty—clay specifications.
18. See Feldstein and Rothschild (197k) for a critique of the constant propor-
tional replacement hypothesis and an analysis of the potential effects on
replacement investment of changes in tax rates andinterestrates.
19. Keynes (1936) emphasized that rising cost of inputs is a principal reason
for the declining marginal efficiency of investment in the short run. See
Brechling (1975) on the empirical importance of this.
20. See, e.g., Coen (1968) and Feldstein and Flemming (1971) for evidence
on this point.
21. See, among others, Auerbach (1978), Bradford (1979), Feldstein, Green and
Sheshinski (1979), King (1977), Miller (1971) and Stiglitz (1973).—67—
22. For an application of this to the empirical study of investmentbehavior,
see Summers (1980).
23. See the references cited in footnote 11.
2I. The Jorgenson procedure also estimates a furtherparameter that should
equal the capital coefficient in the Cobb—Douglas production function, i.e.,
the share of capital income in total output. Estimates of this parameter are
almost invariably far too low; although this indicates that the nodel is
"false", it doesn't necessarily imply that the estimated effects of tax
rules andinflationare misleading.
25. The rate of return on other types of investments might also xiatter. Since
the interaction of inflation and tax rules raised the potential returnon owner—
occupied housing (Feldstein, 1980d; Poterba, 1980), the effect of RU may be
overestimated but this overstatement only reflects anotherway in which infla—
tional and tax rules interact to reduce nonresidential fixed investment.
26. Feldstein and Summers (1977) discuss theconceptual problems in nasuring
the capital income and rate of return. Feldstein and Poterba (1980)use the
new capital stock data provided by the Commerce Department and Federal Reserve
Bank to calculate the pretax rate of return shown in Table 1.
27. Feldstein and Summers (1977) showed that the apparent downtrend in the first
half of the 1970's was not statistically significant. For xrore recentsupport-
ing evidence, see Feldstein and Poterba (1980b).—68—
28.This impact of inflation is discussed in Feldstein, Green and Sheshinski
(1978) and calculated in detail in Feldstein and Summers (1919).
29. This measure of the effective tax rate differs conceptually from the
unadjusted measure in a number of 'ways. It is an ex ante concept for new
investment rather than an ex pot measure on existing capital. No account is
taken of the important effect of inflation on the taxation of artificial
inventory profits or of the changing rates of state and local taxes. The tax
rates on shareholders and creditors are also measured much rre crudely.
30. This specification in terms of investment flows represents a dis-
equilibrium process rather than an equal stock adjustment. The special problems
of capital heterogeneity and putty—clay technology may make this direct dis-
equilibrium specification re appropriate, especially for explaining and pre-
dicting changes in investment over a period of ten to twenty years.
31. Note that since the equation refers to net investment, the past capital
stock is not included. I return to this issue below.
32. Extending the analysis to quarterly observations might nevertheless provide
more information about the time pattern of response and about the effect of
changes in capacity utilization. Of course, the combination of measurement
problems and the inherent autocorrelation of the data imply that using
quarterly observation would not increase the effective degrees of infor-
mation by anything like a factor of four.—69—
33. Since the standard error of the capacity utilization coefficient is
relatively large, the coefficient of 0.028 should be regarded as subject to
considerable error.
314. The sample is 2 years shorter because the information required to calculate
ETRA is not available before 19514 or after 1976.
35. Further evidence in favor of using the net investment series is present in
section 14 of this paper.
36.When the concurrent ratio of the federal deficit to GNP is included, its
coefficient is —0.26 (with a standard error of 0.06) and the coefficient of RH
drops to 0.21 (s.e. =0.10).This maybeevidence of crowding out or it may
merely reflect the tendency of imore investment to increase concurrent national
income and thereby reduce the government deficit.
37. This variable is the Holland and 'ieyers (1979) measure, defined as the ratio of
the aggregate market value of nonfinancial corporations to the net replacement cost
of plant, equipment and inventories. Essentially the same result is obtained
with their broader measure in which all other nonfinancial assets are
included.
38. The predicted inflation rate is based on a rolling series of ARIMA regressions;
see Feldstein and Summers (1978, pages 82487).
39. Theswitch fromRN to ln RN causes a small decrease in the explanatory power
ofthe equation.—70—
14Q.Eventhe two coefficients of the capacity utilization variable do not differ
in a statistically significant way; the difference between them of
0.0149 has a standard error of 0.035.
141. Columns 5 and 6 will be considered in section 4
142.See Feldstein and Summers (1979), Table 14, column 9 for the series of
inflation induced tax increases.
143.Forthe capital stock figures, see Feldstein and Poterba (1980), Table A—i,
column 8.
1414.I have borrowed Irving Fisher's phrase "the rate of return over cost" but not
his exact meaning0 The xodel in the current section is nevertheless very
close in spirit to Fisher's analysis.
145. See Abel (1978) for an explicit derivation of the optimum rule when there are
endogenous adjustment costs.
146. Unless the shift is a uniformone,the answer will depend on the initial
point that is selected. This is a typical index number type problem.
147. The 66.2 percent ratio is selected to produce a steady—state investment
mix corresponding to the average composition over the past twenty years. Note
that this specification ignores inventories and therefore the very substantial
extra tax .buraen caused by inflation with FIFO inventory accounting. While this
need not affect decisions to subsititute capital for labor, it does influence
the return on capital expansion to the extent that this involves greater inven-
tories.—71—
18.Thecalculation of expected inflation series is described in Feldstein and
Summers (1918), ages 8—87.
19. To meet the need for a series of expected long—term inflation rates for other
purposes, Feldstein and Sumraers (1918) calculate a weighted average of these
future inflation rates where the weights are equivalent to discounting
at a fixed interest rate.
50. See Feldstein and Summers (1918, p 90) for a description of the cyclically—
adjusted return series used in the present calculation.
51.Theinverse ofeis the product of Ci)theStandard and Poor's price—earnings
ratioand (2) the ratio of "book profits" to "economics profits" with correc-
tion for inflationary affects onreported depreciation, inventory profits, and
debt.
52. Inflation also raised the cost of funds because the cost of equity fundsas
raisednre than the cost of debt funds fell.
53. This is roughly consistent with a regression equation that indicates that, for
the sample as a whole, each one percentage point increase in the long—term
expected inflation rate reduced the difference MPNR—COFby about1.25
percentagepoints. Between 1966and 1976, the long—term expected inflation
rate(demand from the ARIMA forecasts)rose 3.2percentage points.
5I. Because MPNR does notreflect cyclical variations in the rate of return, these
parametervalues are nost appropriatelycompared to those of equation3.3
rather than equation 3.1.—72—
55. A similar analysis with the varying profitability measure of return provi-
des even nre striking confirmation: the coefficient of MPNRVP is 0.253.(s.e. =
0.155)while the coefficient of COF is —0.202 (s.e. =O.031i).
56.This 0.015 is the difference between the actual 1977 investment ratio of
0.020 and the predicted ratio of 0.035 conditional on nintaining the 1965
level of the return—over—cost.
57. This specification also ignores the adverse effect of inflation through the
taxation of artificial inventory profits. This will ntter to the extent that
inventories, ecjuipment and structures are rt of a combined investment—output
decision.
58. Output is xrasured by the gross domestic product of nonfinancial corporations
and p is the implicit price deflator for that output. The value of c is
defined below.
59. I should again stress that these interferences are all conditional on very
strong and obviously "false" assumptions. For example, it seems very likely
that the assumption of a "putty—putty" technology causes an understatement
o *e truelong—run elasticity ofsubstitution if the true technology is putty—
clay.
60. To simplify notation, I use X to refer to the investment tax credit with the
Long—arnmendmerit adjustment when appropriate. Data on the investment tax
credit refer to actual practice and were supplied by Data Resources, Inc.—73—
61. The putty—putty technology allows alldecisionsto be xrropic and therefore
in principle makes theshort—terminterest rate and short—term inflation rate
the relevant variable (Hall, 1977). A more realistic description of finance and
technology makes a long—term interest rate and inflation the appropriate
variables. I have in fact used the Baa corporate bond rate and the long—term
inflation expectation derived from the "rolling" —ARIMAestimatespresented in
Feldstein and Summers (1978).
62.Equivalently,book earnings are net of nominal interest rayments rather than
real interest ayments. In my calculation, the debt is the net financial
capital supplied by the creditors of the nonfinancial corporations and
inflation is measured by the change in the consumer price index.
63. Note that R +iT equalsthe COF variable of section 14•
6i. In the pure debt case, this would just be the net—of—tax nominal interest rate.
65. The calculation of Z reflects the introduction of accelerated depreciation and
the several reductions in the allowable depreciation life.
66. In both the Cobb—Douglas and accelerator specifications, the estimated value
of the depreciation rate (i.e., the coefficient of the lagged capital stock
variable) is approximately 0.18, a reasonable value for equipment capital
althoughhigher thanthe value of 0.138 used in the cost of capital services
formula andthan the Department of Commerce depreciation rate.67. Thevalueof 0.9 is obtained by searching over a grid at intervals of' 0.1.
It is worth noting that a mismeasurement of the cost of capital series
distorts the estimate of the elasticity of substitution. Using the incorrect
c/p series of column 8 leads to an estimated elasticity of substitution of
0.6. The reduction in the sum of squared residuals to 157.14 (from 167.14 in
the Cobb—Douglas case) is however small and not statistically significant.
68. The value of' c/p in column 7 of Table 5 fell from an average of 0.238 in
19514—57 to 0.213 in 19614—67. The Cobb—Douglas technology implies (see
equation 5.3) that the optimal capital—output ratio is increased by a factor
of 238/215 =1.117.
69. Inflation raises R to the extent that the required equity yield rises by re
than the real cost of debt capital falls.
70. This conclusion stands in sharp contrast to the early view of Hayek and
others that inflation encourages investment by raising profits or the
appearance of profits. That view not only ignored fiscaleffects but also
was essentially a short—run theory.since wages and other costs, aswell
as expectations, would naturally adjust to inflation.
71. On therole of the fiscal structure inthe mismanagement of nnetary çxlicy,
seeFeldstein(l980d).
72. Poterba t1980) and Summers (1980) discuss the theoretical impact ofinflation
on the demand for housing capital. Hartman (1979) presents an analysisof'
the effect on international capital flows and Feldstein (1980a) treats the
demand for government debt. Empirical applications are however still lacking.